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1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate the politics of market construction. We
do so using the empirical example of energy markets in the UK and their
governance through communities. The last 30 years have seen compe-
titive energy markets become the central model for organising national
energy systems around the world, particularly throughout much of the
global North. International governance institutions, including the
European Commission, have overseen drives to privatise and ‘liberalise’
energy systems, underwritten by belief that market forces represent the
most eﬃcient means of regulation (Helm, 2003; Jamasb and Pollitt,
2005). Yet persistent ‘market failures’ and their negative social and
environmental consequences are widely acknowledged (Helm, 2002;
Bolton and Foxon, 2015). This contradiction is a central pivot in an
ongoing 'double movement' between pro-market and pro-social action
(Polanyi, 1944), which together constitute energy market construction.
A philosophical commitment to deregulation, combined with a so-
cial responsibility (and electoral imperative) to mitigate its worst ef-
fects on people and the planet, creates challenges for governments. One
response has been to enrol other actors and technologies to implement
and enact change, part of a strategy of governing ‘at a distance’ (Rose
and Miller, 1992). This has notably included mobilisation or co-opta-
tion of ‘community’ across multiple policy domains (Somerville, 2016),
including energy.
Although there is a burgeoning literature on governance of com-
munity energy to meet climate change and sustainability goals, to date
little explicit attention has been paid to community as a means for
governing energy markets, which is our primary concern here. We look
at the UK government's Community Energy Strategy (DECC, 2014a,
2015) to explore how this sector is understood as a potential driver of
market change. Drawing on a large, unique body of empirical research,
we present a case study of the entangled and contested processes of
making markets. Our research covers four modes of energy market
construction: making policy, shaping existing markets, creating new
markets and cultivating consumers. We take our cue from a number of
distinct but complementary developments in recent economic sociology
and geography, which build on Polanyi’s (1944) insight that
establishment of market-oriented economies is inherently social, poli-
tical and far from inevitable. In combination these contributions em-
phasise: the partial, uneven, spatially contingent and conﬂictual pro-
cesses of instituting (neo)liberal governance regimes (Brenner et al,
2010); the necessarily active and ongoing construction of markets
(Beckert, 2009; Caliskan and Callon, 2010); and the diversity of inter-
dependent economic practices and discourses at work in any given
social context, undermining the assumed ubiquity of capitalist com-
modity production for market exchange (Gibson-Graham, 2006a,
2006b). In response, this paper seeks to document and understand
‘actually existing’ negotiations between competing logics in market
construction, focusing on attempts to govern markets through com-
munities (and communities through markets). Following Gibson-
Graham’s (2008) call to ‘re-read for diﬀerence’, we look again at the
multifaceted relationship between government and community re-
presentatives to consider the diﬀerent dynamics at play beyond a uni-
directional story of government co-opting community. In particular the
article adds to existing literature by highlighting, in the case of UK
energy markets: (a) the heterogeneity of understandings, purposes,
technologies and organisational forms coalescing between but also
within states, communities and the commercial sector; (b) how con-
testation between market and non-market logics patterns organisation
and action at multiple orders of magniﬁcation, in what might be termed
a fractal double movement; and (c) how these recursive processes of
negotiation, resistance and conﬂict are performed diﬀerently, to
varying eﬀects according to their speciﬁc contexts. While our ﬁndings
have immediate relevance to understanding deployment of community
in governing energy markets, our ambition is that the analysis makes a
signiﬁcant contribution to broader debates on the politics of markets
and marketisation.
2. The negotiated construction of markets
Markets are important means of regulating behaviour and creating
order in contemporary societies. Indeed, “markets are the central in-
stitutions of capitalist economies” (Beckert, 2009, p. 245). At a basic
level dominant policy discourses assume that markets are eﬃcient and
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achieve optimal distribution of resources: consumer choice is seen to
regulate providers of goods and services, keeping prices low and quality
high; conversely price signals regulate levels of demand (Blaug, 1997).
But markets are not natural phenomena. They are not a priori
‘forces’ (Mitchell, 2008); nor are they the only or necessarily primary
form of economic behaviour (Polanyi, 1944). All markets are con-
structed. They evolve or are ‘invented’ through processes of market-
isation (Caliskan and Callon, 2010), rooted in broader social and ma-
terial conﬁgurations at particular points in space and time:
“all economies are socially hosted, politically mediated, and in-
stitutionally regulated … economic forms, behaviors, and relations
are inescapably embedded in ‘instituted’ social forms, behaviors,
and relations.” (Peck, 2013a, p. 1541)
The inherently social and political (or embedded) nature of markets
renders them unstable, requiring ceaseless intervention to function in
ways that meet societal goals: “the fully self-regulating market is a
utopian project; it is something that cannot exist” (Block, 2001, p. xxiv).
Moreover, construction of emergent social phenomena such as markets
is multilateral, occurring at the intersection of multiple interests. Their
continual making and remaking is thus always a negotiated process.
Markets are shaped from both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (Muellerleile,
2013) by everything from acts of parliament, corporate strategy and
collective civic action to the mundane details of individual transactions.
Enhanced understanding of market construction therefore implies dia-
logue between a political-economic concern with the structural/in-
stitutional determinants of markets and a cultural-economic focus on
their inner workings, bridged by geographical accounts of spatial var-
iation in how markets take form and are governed (Hall, 2011, 2012;
Peck, 2012; Muellerleile, 2013; Christophers, 2014, 2015).
Our interest here is in how contestation and negotiation play out at
multiple sites and scales. At the macro level, market construction en-
tails the creation of institutional conditions for widespread market-
based exchange to ﬂourish. 19th-century England saw concerted poli-
tical eﬀort to construct a ‘market society’, driven by pursuit of a self-
regulating economy, but met by a reactive ‘countermovement’ for social
protection (Polanyi, 1944). Likewise, more recent accounts of ‘actually
existing’ neoliberal political projects reveal a story of situated conﬂict
and crisis management (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck et al, 2018;
see also Leitner et al, 2007).
Two particular features of Polanyi’s (1944) dialectical ‘double
movement’ are worth emphasising. First, it is primarily a conﬂict be-
tween logics or ‘organizing principles’ – between ‘the principle of eco-
nomic liberalism’ and that of ‘social protection’ – rather than strictly a
conﬂict between rival factions of ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ actors
(Polanyi, 1944 p. 138). Second, the double movement is characterised
by a somewhat counterintuitive interplay between intentionality and
spontaneity: pro-market reforms require more political will and co-
ordination than might be assumed; pro-social interventions are not al-
ways the outcome of deliberate strategy. As Polanyi puts it, ‘laissez-faire
was planned; planning was not’ (Polanyi, 1944 p.147).
While Polanyi’s analysis considers societal-level transformation over
a broad sweep of time, our argument is that similar patterns of con-
testation and negotiation are visible when observing the construction of
markets at ever-closer quarters. This means taking seriously the politics
of market-making beyond the traditional political-economic concern
with large-scale, enduring social structures. By recognising markets
(and states, communities, etc.) as performatively reproduced in ev-
eryday discourse and practice, the future of these arrangements be-
comes ‘up for grabs’. The challenge is less to dismantle the status quo
than to make something diﬀerent (Gibson-Graham, 2006b). Despite
this, a critical question remains: “not why markets, in theory, are fragile
but why, in practice, they are not” (Christophers, 2015: 1861). Here,
Butler’s (2010) clariﬁcation that most performative acts are of a weak,
‘perlocutionary’ kind is helpful. They exist in tension with other dis-
courses and practices, producing “certain kinds of eﬀects … if and only
if certain kinds of felicitous conditions are met” (p.152; see also Callon,
2010; Christophers, 2014). How do these conditions arise or otherwise?
Cardwell (2015) draws further on Butler (and by extension Foucault) to
consider how disciplinary power operates in the “management of pos-
sibility” (p.712), cultivating particular types of (market) actor and
making certain forms of exchange more likely to emerge than others.
These live questions are pertinent to our own analysis of the uses of
community in governing market activity.
For example we might home in on the creation, governance and
day-to-day functioning of particular markets, themselves the outcome
of ongoing negotiation through strategic and everyday performance.
The negative by-products of markets ‘provoke’ diﬀerent actions from
society (governments, businesses, political activists, interest groups,
civic movements etc.), but despite being ‘ultimately triggered by the
(same) contradictory forces of marketization’ (Peck, 2013b, p. 1560),
these actions take diﬀerent forms in diﬀerent contexts. There is value,
then, in investigating conﬂicting impulses within ‘actually existing’ sites
of market exchange: markets for particular goods and services, located
at particular points in space and time (Peck, 2012).
At this point we might broaden our view again to explore how that
market co-exists with the diversity of other economic relations and
modes of exchange thriving within supposedly ‘commodiﬁed’ economic
spheres (see Gibson-Graham, 2006a; Williams, 2005). Alternatively, we
might narrow our focus further to examine the character of particular
transactions. Even commercial and consumer activity that initially ap-
pears driven by proﬁt motives or utility maximisation frequently in-
volves appeal to more classically ‘social’ logics (White and Williams,
2010; North and Nurse, 2014).
In the empirical analysis that follows, we apply this approach of
zooming in and out (cf. Nicolini, 2010) to explore the continual (re)
construction of energy markets. In doing so, we observe similar patterns
of contestation and negotiation at multiple levels of focus: this can be
understood as a fractal double movement.
3. Communities, energy markets and the state
In this article we are particularly interested in the state’s role in
managing the contradictions of (energy) market activity which –
through the impossibility of becoming truly 'disembedded' – create
conﬂict in the sociomaterial realm. The state is but one point of med-
iation between market and non-market logics, but it remains a powerful
locus of change.
Like markets, states are constructed from inside and outside.
Government is an ongoing accomplishment of actors, protocols and
technologies working together in departments which have diﬀering
remits, goals, and relationships with other departments, while also
being subject to overarching institutional logics about how to practise
statecraft. Furthermore, neither markets nor states can be understood in
isolation from their contexts. Markets operate diﬀerently in diﬀerent
situations; they vary in their internal logic, having diﬀerent 'rules';
people and institutions engage diﬀerently with diﬀerent markets; states
look to shape markets in diﬀerent ways (and so on).
This leads us to question what makes energy markets distinctive in
comparison to other forms of market. Energy – used for heat, light,
mobility (and so on) – is a necessity for sustaining individual human life
and for societal organisation. Arguably energy provision could be
considered a public rather than private good (Abbott, 2001; Brown,
2001).
Energy markets facilitate exchange of various goods and services.
This includes production and supply of electricity generated from dif-
ferent sources. In 2017, for example, 40% of UK electricity was gen-
erated from gas combustion, 29% from renewable energy sources and
21% from nuclear energy (BEIS, 2018a). 86% of homes in Great Britain
are supplied with mains gas for cooking and heating (BEIS, 2018b). This
is higher than most other countries: for instance district heating rather
than mains gas is responsible for over half of heating and cooling
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demand in many northern European nations including Denmark,
Sweden and Finland, and in other countries liqueﬁed gas, oil and solid
fuels remain prevalent (European Commission, 2016a). Each of these
subsets of energy markets has its own distinctive traits. However, en-
ergy users remain distanced from the technicalities of where their gas
and electricity comes from, in part reﬂecting the predominance of
centralised energy supply (Soutar and Mitchell, 2018). From a user
perspective energy markets deliver homogeneous products, which
makes energy diﬃcult to marketise as a consumer good (Giulietti et al,
2005).
The structure of the UK energy system is complex. Gas and elec-
tricity grids are nationally coordinated, with regional bodies re-
sponsible for distribution to households. Diﬀerent retailers then act as
mediators, buying the energy produced by generators and selling it to
customers (energy users). Market arrangements proliferate between
and across the diﬀerent types of energy organisation involved, yet with
limited product diﬀerentiation for end-users. Individual generators
generally need to connect to the national grid to buy and sell energy;
the alternative is to develop new ‘private wire’ arrangements by in-
stalling new cables to deliver energy directly to customers. This is costly
and potentially represents a risk to continuity of supply: usually private
wire customers retain a grid connection as back-up.
3.1. Governing energy markets
The generation and distribution of energy has a long, varied history
of direct state involvement – in a legislative capacity, as a supplier, and
in ongoing regulation – reﬂecting energy’s status as critical to national
wellbeing (Helm, 2002). The prevailing trend since the early 1980s has
been state-led energy liberalisation programmes, seeking to create
conditions for more eﬃcient energy systems through reduced public
ownership and increased competition (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). The
extent of privatisation and deregulation in national energy systems
varies, even within the EU where market liberalisation remains an ex-
plicit policy goal. The UK was a forerunner within Europe (Bulmer et al,
2007), while leading lights of liberalisation elsewhere include Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Chile and Argentina (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).
Many EU nations, including France, Denmark, the Netherlands and
Sweden have retained signiﬁcant levels of public ownership; majority
state-owned enterprises account for 24% of EU energy industry turn-
over (European Commission, 2016a).
Regardless of national diﬀerences, the imagined self-regulating
market has never materialised. Energy markets have failed in two re-
lated senses. First, they have produced negative ‘externalities’. These
range from greenhouse gas emissions to a raft of social consequences
stemming from regressive pricing structures, diﬀerential access to tar-
iﬀs and energy sources, and socio-spatially uneven impacts of en-
vironmental damage (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012).
Second, energy markets have failed to function eﬀectively through
breakdown in internal order. In general, Beckert (2009) identiﬁes three
key sources of market instability: problems agreeing the value of het-
erogeneous products; deﬁcits of competition leading to higher prices
than economically necessary; and the social risks of cooperation, re-
ﬂecting uncertainty as to the intentions of the exchange partner or the
qualities of the product or service to be exchanged. In energy markets,
problems of cooperation and competition have dominated. In the UK,
for example, customer trust in energy companies is low (Yougov, 2014)
owing to a history of market abuse, lack of transparency, complex tariﬀ
structures and perceived overcharging (Ofgem, 2014). In addition,
weak competition and the legacy of a regionally organised supply
system further contribute to low levels of switching between energy
providers (Ofgem, 2014). Entry barriers for new suppliers are high (Koh
and Goucher, 2014), reducing scope for increased competition.
3.2. Constructing communities for market governance
If markets are inevitably unstable and do not satisfactorily self-
regulate, the challenge for contemporary liberal governments is to ﬁnd
ways of intervening while maintaining the primacy of market me-
chanisms as the central means for coordinating complex systems. The
resulting balancing act means adopting “a range of devices which seek
both to create a distance between the formal institutions of the state
and other social actors, and to act upon them” (Miller and Rose, 1992,
p. 297). One potential outcome is for indirect intervention through
'market-shaping', nudging actions and enrolment of other actors to
carry out the work of government (Eadson, 2016).
An increasingly popular approach to governing ‘at-a-distance’ is via
the malleable notion of 'community'. This has become an important part
of policy discourse in numerous domains (Somerville, 2016; Rose,
1996) including energy transitions. There is a burgeoning body of lit-
erature on this subject, particularly regarding environmental sustain-
ability (Taylor Aiken et al, 2017), but not speciﬁcally on uses of com-
munity in governing energy markets.
‘Community’ variously refers to the target population of interven-
tions or the actors that implement them, and in many cases both si-
multaneously (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008). Elided with 'local',
community often implies a scale of activity, strong interpersonal ties
and/or shared meanings (Taylor Aiken, 2015). As a mode of organisa-
tion or of economic activity it suggests a third way, distinct from market
or state (Levitas, 2000). While there are important diﬀerences between
uses of the term, it is common for 'community' to be used imprecisely,
implicitly drawing on several of these associations at the same time.
Alongside an underlying understanding of community as virtuous
(DeFilippis et al, 2006; Delanty, 2010), its versatility as a term is ap-
pealing from a governmental perspective.
For various reasons communities might helpfully be 'put to use'
(Taylor Aiken, 2015) in achieving governmental goals for energy
markets. 'Governing-through-communities' (Rose, 1996) provides ways
to indirectly intervene in markets at a distance from government;
communities are seen as non-political intermediaries, able to enrol non-
state actors to willingly act on state goals (Rose, 1996). Community
becomes an important object for contemporary statecraft whereby
“power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints on citizens as of
‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom”
(Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 174). Community as a governed territory has
its own appeal. The sub-local scale is often a state institutional void,
with few formal structures in place (Eadson, 2016). This allows freedom
for policy experimentation, unencumbered by existing institutions and
path-dependencies. Similarly, as non-party-political entities, commu-
nities can potentially be enrolled and mobilised by central government
in ways that, for example, local authorities cannot. In sum, “Community
… is not a site removed or free from state power and state eﬀects, but is
a key site where the state can be seen to act” (Taylor Aiken, 2015, p.
777).
Viewed in relation to market failure, communities oﬀer a range of
possible solutions. Community energy activities potentially provide a
source of new market competition through energy production, dis-
tribution, storage and supply; a site of technological, social and eco-
nomic innovation; and a means for achieving behaviour change among
energy 'consumers' (DECC, 2014a). They could also include fostering
'critical niches' (Smith et al, 2016) oﬀering alternative economic models
less reliant on largescale ﬁnancial systems to operate or promoting
more radically distributed ownership of energy systems.
Of course communities are not only governmental constructs; a
large part of their appeal to policy actors stems from the success of
existing civil society movements. Examples include the growth of
community energy as a sector in the UK, Australia and the United States
as well as cooperative energy movements across Europe (Becker and
Kunze, 2014), notably in Germany and Denmark. Community is well
established as an arena of negotiation (cf. Bond, 2011; Spencer, 2012;
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Armstrong and Bulkeley, 2014; Creamer, 2015). Situating community
as governmental object and as arena of civil society organisation
therefore places it as a point of negotiation between governmental lo-
gics, broader ‘landscape’ forces (such as the primacy of markets) and
beyond-market values.
We now introduce the empirical material for the article by brieﬂy
outlining the UK policy context and research methods, before pro-
ceeding to thematic data analysis.
4. Community energy policy in the UK
In the UK, activities known as ‘community energy’ have a history
long predating their emergence in mainstream policy. A broad deﬁni-
tion includes energy generation, purchase and/or conservation in-
itiatives owned or operated by, and beneﬁtting, communities of place
or of interest (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008; Seyfang et al, 2013).
Community energy has existed at least since the advent of the alter-
native technology movement in the early 1970s and until recently with
little state support (Smith, 2003; Walker et al, 2007; Hargreaves et al,
2013). Small-scale renewable energy has had a longstanding associa-
tion with radical movements seeking holistic and democratic ap-
proaches to sustainability transitions. These currents are by no means
extinct, notably expressed in the activities of the Transition movement
(North, 2010; Seyfang and Haxeltine, 2012).
Policy interest in community energy grew in the 2000s, exempliﬁed
by the energy white paper, Our Energy Future (DTI, 2003). This posi-
tioned decentralised renewable energy generation as central to future
supply, especially in the context of low carbon transitions, making it
‘the ﬁrst articulation of the importance of the local level in national
[UK] energy policy’ (Catney et al, 2014, p. 719). The Climate Change
and Sustainable Energy Act 2006 subsequently aimed to increase pre-
valence of microgeneration and imposed a duty on the Secretary of
State to ‘promote community energy projects’ (Section 19). The fol-
lowing white paper,Meeting the Energy Challenge (DTI, 2007), continued
to advocate community renewable energy and the role of community
organisations in promoting individual energy behaviour change (pp.
62–3).
Between 2001 and 2010 various government-backed initiatives
were launched, each supporting, promoting or funding community
energy and framed as responses to climate change and/or fuel poverty.1
Notable examples include: the Community Renewables Initiative
(2001–07) and Community Action for Energy (later Green Commu-
nities, 2002–11), which facilitated the development of community-led
energy eﬃciency and renewable energy projects; the Community En-
ergy Saving Programme (2009–12), obliging energy companies to de-
liver energy eﬃciency measures for households in speciﬁc low-income
areas by ‘forming, and utilising existing, local and community part-
nerships’ (DECC, 2011, p.10); and the Low Carbon Communities
Challenge (2010–12), which provided funding and advice for local
projects delivering a combination of renewable energy, installation of
domestic energy eﬃciency measures, and educational or engagement
activities.
The community energy sector was also aﬀected by policy changes
from 2010 onwards, coinciding with transition from a Labour govern-
ment to a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. These included:
introduction of, and subsequent reductions in, feed-in tariﬀs providing
ﬁnancial incentives for renewable energy generation; and the short-
lived Green Deal, which ﬁnanced loans for energy eﬃciency measures
in domestic properties, designed to be paid back via savings in fuel bills.
These developments represented a “signiﬁcant shift … away from
grants and the subsidy of upfront investment costs, and towards rev-
enue-guarantee schemes to encourage new forms of ‘community
enterprise’” (Hargreaves et al, 2013, p. 871). These sit within a broader
response from government and the independent regulator, Ofgem,
aiming to promote greater market diversity.
For much of the period described above, UK community energy
policy was proliﬁc but unsystematic (Smith et al., 2016). In response,
the 2010–15 coalition government developed a national Community
Energy Strategy (CES) (DECC, 2013a, 2014a, 2015a). The CES drew on
research evidence and was produced in consultation with community
energy actors. It consolidated existing and proposed measures to sup-
port the sector to form partnerships, build community capacity, share
knowledge and measure impact. It also announced and/or promoted
funding streams, most prominently the Rural- and Urban Community
Energy Funds (2013 onwards and 2014–16 respectively). These funds
provided small grants and loans for initial development of renewable
energy projects. They focused on pump-priming private investment to
take projects to full market ‘readiness’ (DECC, 2014b), at which point
private ﬁnance was expected to cover construction and implementa-
tion.
Market logics pervade the CES. Ministerial statements exhort com-
munities to “exercise real market power” (Ed Davey, Secretary of State
for Energy and Climate Change), “increase choice and competition” and
“break the grip of the dominant big energy companies” (Gregory
Barker, Minister for Energy and Climate Change; see DECC, 2014a, p. 4
and p. 50). Community energy is framed explicitly as a means to im-
prove market competition and consequently produce a better func-
tioning energy system.
4.1. Methods
This article draws on four research projects delivered between 2013
and 2017. The main primary data sources are two UK government-
funded projects investigating programmes that feature prominently in
the CES (DECC, 2015b; DECC, 2015c); these are supplemented by data
from a University-funded research project on collective switching, and
further interviews with community energy practitioners conducted
speciﬁcally for this article. Ethical approval was granted by Sheﬃeld
Hallam University for each stage of the research. Although individual
projects had diﬀerent research questions to those we ask here, com-
bining these datasets provides a powerful evidence base for analysing
community energy policy processes. 227 in-depth qualitative interviews
were conducted across the projects, including interviews with re-
presentatives from UK government, national charities, industry bodies,
local authorities, voluntary and community sector organisations, do-
mestic energy users and private companies. Interviews were pro-
fessionally transcribed and were re-analysed in development of this
article, which also draws on analysis of monitoring data from the Big
Energy Saving Network and collective switching projects. Data under-
went initial coding for each individual research project. Subsequent
reﬂection on these studies highlighted common themes around the
malleable uses of community and conﬂicting market/non-market lo-
gics, prompting our present focus. We ﬁrst revisited the CES, coding
portions of the text relating to the meanings and uses of community,
responsibilisation of energy consumers and the marketisation of the
community energy sector. We then returned to the empirical data, de-
veloping a new thematic coding framework speciﬁc to our current re-
search questions on contested processes of market construction.
The following sections focus on this empirical material, exploring
the fractal negotiated processes of market construction at diﬀerent
points within the policy process and at diﬀerent levels of magniﬁcation.
These are summarised in Table 1, which sets out arenas for negotiation
and contestation, governmental tools involved, discourses of commu-
nity deployed, roles of community and key points of negotiation and
contestation. The interventions we examine here share an under-
standing of community energy as both vehicle and target for market
(re)construction. Despite variegated manifestations, the common thrust
throughout is one of drawing energy communities further into market
1 For a more detailed overview of policy developments over this period see
Walker et al (2007) and Catney et al (2014).
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modes of exchange (as producers or consumers), in order to facilitate
better (self-)governance of those markets and address their social and
environmental externalities.
Analysis begins with a short exposition of the policy-making process
behind the CES, to reveal the conﬂicted nature of policy construction.
We then consider how market-shaping activities in the CES have im-
pacted on the community energy sector, before homing in on an ex-
ample of new market construction. Finally we explore how demand-
side measures have been translated and mediated as they have come to
ground.
Although the CES is a UK-wide document we focus on England:
increasing divergence between England and the devolved nations of
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales adds additional complexity that
we felt unable to convincingly capture here for reasons of space and
internal coherence of the article.
5. Negotiating and producing state logics of intervention
Consistent with Polanyi’s conceptualisation of institutions as “cul-
turally created, stabilized and challenged in diﬀerent places and at
diﬀerent times” (North, 2016, p. 438), the community energy sector is
subject to diﬀerent interest groups that shape it as both subject and
object. As introduced above, community energy was never neutral;
before mainstream policy interest it had an already long and diverse
history, including signiﬁcant grounding in grassroots social and en-
vironmental movements and with experience of negotiating relation-
ships with states and markets. The development of the CES itself in-
volved a range of diﬀerent actors, including an advisory group
consisting of community energy bodies, energy industry re-
presentatives, think tanks, local authorities and individual community
energy projects, as well as civil servants from the Department for En-
ergy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Department for Communities
and Local Government (DCLG).2 All funding commitments also required
assent from The Treasury (HMT). Lobbying by diﬀerent community
energy umbrella bodies was important to press the case for greater
strategic commitment from government (Smith et al., 2016), but dif-
ferent actors within government also viewed the purpose and im-
portance of the strategy diﬀerently. Stakeholders saw the then Secre-
tary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Liberal Democrat MP Ed
Davey, as the ‘driving force’ for the CES, particularly one that viewed
community energy as a potential market corrective. Civil servants in
DECC were reportedly less keen, leading to conﬂicting ideas about the
strategy’s purpose:
“The main reason it came out was the driving force of people like Ed
Davey who really wanted to do something, but the civil servants
back then didn’t really understand what the point was and it was
very much the Lib Dems pushing it. Also in terms of lack of un-
derstanding [by the civil servants] I remember there was a big de-
bate over fracking; they wanted fracking within the community
energy strategy cos they see it as it’s local energy and fracking would
then give money to local community to counteract the damaging
eﬀects or whatever, so it was about getting over that perception that
community energy isn’t about an energy project being done to the
community and giving them money.” (National stakeholder, inter-
view)
This stark example illustrates how divergent understandings of
community, and of community energy as a market phenomenon, were
negotiated at the macro level of national strategy. Community energy
bodies sought to raise the proﬁle of the sector and gain increased
support from government; some leading politicians saw potential in
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2 In June 2016, DECC was subsumed within the Department for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). In January 2018, DCLG became the
Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG).
W. Eadson and M. Foden Geoforum 100 (2019) 21–31
25
community empowerment to correct market failures; others in the ad-
ministrative arm of the state saw communities as a potential impedi-
ment to/enabler of energy policy goals and commercial interests, to be
carefully managed through ﬁnancial compensation.
Despite broad consultation some respondents felt that a particular
conception of community energy was being advanced, in part due to
precisely who represented the sector:
“They were from the bigger, more professional side of community
energy, so they were great people who were doing it for the right
reasons but it probably didn’t pick up the other smaller community
energy type projects so it was probably swayed in a particular di-
rection.” (National Stakeholder, interview)
This ‘particular direction’ was “the start of us moving away from the
whole community development-type-thing more into being seen as part
of the energy market”, making “community energy more of a viable
option” (National Stakeholder, interview). From this view, govern-
mental attempts to marketise community energy can be seen as an
economisation process making projects legible as governmental and
societal objects within a set of institutions dependent on economic
processes (Rydin et al, 2015). More speciﬁcally, the particular actors
involved (and not involved) in negotiating the strategy shaped the
framing of community energy that emerged: the role of the Treasury in
signing-oﬀ funding requests, the preconceptions of DECC oﬃcials, the
ideological commitments of ministers, and the representatives involved
in the consultation process all aﬀected how community energy markets
came to be constructed within the strategy. Likewise both quotes above
also show how market/beyond-market pressures cannot be straight-
forwardly read-oﬀ as ‘large companies’ versus ‘civil society’ or ‘state’
versus ‘community’. Tensions existed across the range of societal actors.
We now move on to consider how diﬀerent modes of marketisation
within the strategy were implemented, and the resultant processes of
negotiation and translation by the programmes’ targets.
6. Negotiating new logics of action through market-shaping
The CES packaged a range of measures seeking to put community to
use in shaping energy markets. By ‘market-shaping’ we mean creating
institutional conditions (rules, metrics, instruments, incentives and so
on) so that market exchange happens in a particular way, but without
explicitly interfering in the act of exchange itself or the wider principles
of market self-organisation. Examples include feed-in-tariﬀs, and var-
ious grants and loans outlined above, designed to help projects achieve
‘investment readiness’ (DECC, 2014b).
While these mechanisms supported community energy growth in
the UK (DECC, 2015a) they embedded community energy within en-
ergy and ﬁnancial markets. The underlying assumption is that for
community energy producers to change market practices, they must
enter those markets. For instance, feed-in-tariﬀs only apply to energy
sold into the electricity grid, meaning ﬁnancial viability is often reliant
on formal energy market engagement.
One consequence of community energy being shaped as a market
object has been increased availability of diﬀerent forms of private and
alternative ﬁnancial investment. This includes direct loans from private
investors, commercial loans and peer-to-peer funding. An example of
the latter is Abundance, an organisation encouraging individuals to
invest in community energy projects, while also hosting a secondary
trading market for buying and selling investments. Pension funds are
also investing in community energy projects (IPPR, 2016). Community
energy projects become entangled with capital markets; and private
investment increases the onus on generating ﬁnancial returns.
Practitioners reﬂected on the tensions created by ﬁnancialisation of
small-scale energy schemes. One outlined their dissonant experience at
a recent sector conference in England:
“…there was social investors there, some big banks, they’ve got
millions of pounds ready and waiting to invest, trying to encourage
groups to even start buying up established solar farms so they can
invest and get the ﬁfteen years left of subsidy, so it’s a marketization
of community energy and that’s good because [community energy]
is still a small part of the energy market and investment helps to
establish it… but you worry that you lose what you were setting out
to do.” (Community energy practitioner, interview)
Another stakeholder personiﬁed the continual back-and-forth of
contradictory logics. While opening up new funding sources these new
investment models potentially loosen ties between community energy
projects and the community they seek to serve:
“I think that’s really exciting … but again we’re going to have to
think of the messaging around that cos if [investment is] less and
less through shares and more and more through loans and bonds
how does that aﬀect the community energy model, how engaged are
communities if you’re crowdsourcing funding? They’re interested in
support for renewable energy but they’re not really interested in
what’s happening in [place name] or something like that, so you
don’t get that same level of engagement, the whole one member one
vote you get with community shares, which maybe you don’t need,
maybe the input is the fact that at least it’s being able to fund that
local community to do something rather than getting investors ac-
tively involved, but it’s something we’ll have to think about.”
(National stakeholder, interview)
At stake here are the aims of ‘community energy’ as a movement.
Another participant framed this with respect to the roots of the com-
munity energy sector, focused on community development, and then to
the impact of the introduction and subsequent reductions of feed-in-
tariﬀs,3 which they felt repositioned increasing energy supply as the
dominant objective:
“So do we want to keep doing small projects that might have a big
impact at local level but not really any broader, or do we want to
grow? But if we do that how do we do that without losing the ethos
of community energy and do we go back to our roots which was
about community development trusts? … When feed-in-tariﬀs came
in, it was to a certain extent a bit more about chasing the money, as
groups started developing those [microgeneration] schemes to bring
in income to do community activities, so now it’s going back to how
we did it before we were developing those schemes, cos I think some
groups lost the focus of why they were doing it; it became about
solar panels on buildings rather than the outcomes.” (National sta-
keholder, interview)
Roth and Dressler (2012) show how governmental market-me-
chanisms in conservation made market exchange appear the best so-
lution to challenges faced by rural farmers when it did not necessarily
serve their long-term interests. Likewise, the above quote implies that
growth of a particular form of community energy on the back of rela-
tively generous ﬁnancial incentives led to a narrow focus on energy
production against wider social and environmental goals. The sub-
sequent scaling back of subsidies, reduction in cost of renewable energy
technologies and emergence of diﬀerent ﬁnancial mechanisms could, it
is suggested, lead to re-diversiﬁcation and reconsideration of what
community energy could and should be.
Feed-in-tariﬀ reductions also led to community energy organisa-
tions seeking to buy existing private sector assets – such as wind tur-
bines – as an alternative approach, partly to beneﬁt from feed-in-tariﬀs
3 From 2015 a range of policy changes, including signiﬁcantly reduced feed-
in-tariﬀ rates, made it harder for community energy schemes to be seen as ﬁ-
nancially viable. Other changes included reduced tax breaks for community
organisations through removal of Enterprise Investment Scheme tax relief;
changes to the legal status of co-ops for community energy; and changes to the
Renewable Obligation.
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agreed prior to policy changes. Again, interviews reveal conﬂicting
normative assumptions about marketisation as a phenomenon. Some
practitioners were uneasy about this development, seen as going
against a ‘do-it-yourself’ ethos where community building was achieved
through the often drawn-out, diﬃcult process of developing an energy
project ‘from scratch’. For others it was a pragmatic response to a
changing political and ﬁnancial landscape and/or a positive political
action of taking private assets into collective ownership.
In practice, although scaling back feed-in-tariﬀs impacted the
community energy sector it did not disentangle it from energy markets.
Even without feed-in-tariﬀs, community energy groups are often ob-
liged to sell energy to commercial suppliers to generate returns on in-
vestment, as conditions on energy supply licenses hinder small orga-
nisations selling directly to customers via the grid. This situation creates
diﬃculties for retaining beneﬁts within localities by providing local
residents and businesses with cheaper energy. Community energy
groups in the UK can circumvent market provision regulations by
supplying buildings directly rather than using network infrastructure,
but these limit potential for projects to supply whole communities and
installing new standalone cables can be expensive.
In summary, the UK government’s approach to community market-
shaping draws community energy actors into a series of market en-
tanglements, rather than opening up new spaces for alternative eco-
nomic arrangements. Negotiation happens at a practical level, in na-
vigating the changing policy landscape, its implications on the ground,
and the tensions created with pro-social goals around community de-
velopment and local democracy. Viewed one way, these entanglements
mark further incremental moves towards ever-greater marketisation.
The role of community energy in changing market practices is poten-
tially diminished by focusing on making communities market-ready
(rather than more proactively on re-embedding markets in civil so-
ciety). However, we have also seen how diﬀerent forms of community
energy can emerge that variously seek to engage with, reappropriate, or
opt-out of market entanglements. In addition, recent policy changes
have allowed the market model to become reopened to question, de-
pendent on individual projects’ goals. Conversely, such contingency
potentially inhibits sector growth as well as being the outcome of an
unstable regulatory regime that increases uncertainty in all projects.
7. Negotiating new markets as alternatives to incumbent systems
The above market-shaping activity seeks to draw community energy
actors into existing markets, in order to diversify energy supply and
introduce greater competition. The CES also includes programmes to
achieve similar results by creating new energy markets, for example,
through incentivising new forms of energy distribution. By new markets
we mean the creation of new products as market entities, with a new set
of institutions, infrastructures and rules. Community or district heating
is given particular priority, heating multiple dwellings or premises from
a single heat source with advantages for resource and cost eﬃciency.
Similar to community microgeneration, governmental interest in dis-
trict heating involves mainstreaming a previously existing but not
widespread technology through focusing on ﬁnancialisation and mar-
ketisation. The focus and approach to heat network development
highlights the challenges of deploying disruptive technologies through
established market approaches. Here negotiation appears at various
points of contact between the new technology and established prac-
tices.
Deployment has been incentivised by government grants and loans
for local authorities, acting on behalf of communities (understood here
as residents of the geographic area covered by a scheme). Again,
funding has prioritised helping local authorities and partners develop a
‘business case’ to attract ﬁnancial investment. District heating is ex-
pected to appeal to energy users through guaranteed lower costs.
However, payback periods for investment in this capital-intensive
technology can be 40 years. To reduce ﬁnancial risk and appear
attractive to investors, customers must sign-up for lengthy contracts.
Alongside signiﬁcant costs in moving to another source, this makes heat
networks de facto monopoly providers. Partly owing to this monopoly
status concerns over consumer protection have been prominent. An
industry-led consumer protection body was recently established, but
concerns remain about lack of legal protection for heat network cus-
tomers (Citizens Advice, 2016). In addition, there is no established
price-setting mechanism; new heat networks often instead peg prices to
natural gas rates as a means of ‘stabilising’ (Caliskan and Callon, 2010)
what is in the UK a relatively novel technology for most people.
These diﬃculties have often counteracted the appeal of cost-savings
to potential customers, in turn creating problems for attracting ﬁnancial
capital. In summary, marketised district heating has had diﬃculty
overcoming Beckert’s (2009) three challenges of market coordination,
relating to valuation (diﬃculty establishing a price for district heat),
competition (district heating as monopoly provider) and cooperation
(customers’ lack of trust in a ‘novel’ product). Those attempting to
develop schemes in the UK have:
“…struggled to eﬀectively ‘pacify’ … the HN [heat network] as a
market object within established, obdurate market and infra-
structural arrangements. HNs are a disruptive local innovation.
Network-builders therefore face diﬃculties in economising their
projects: turning it from an innovative to conventional project in
order to make it part of established market arrangements.”
(Ambrose et al., 2016)
Because of the risks of developing and maintaining district heating
in a marketised setting, many are developed in partnership with private
ﬁrms, often involving long leases. This creates problems for community
leaders seeking to retain inﬂuence over future decisions and ensure that
schemes continue to reﬂect community members’ interests.
The case of heat networks emphasises the problems faced when
market conditions are placed on innovations that are not readily mar-
ketised, must compete with deeply embedded incumbent systems and
do not fare particularly well as ﬁnancial investments (see also Webb
and Hawkey, 2017). The technology and business model are, in eﬀect,
inherently resistant to marketisation, regardless of active civic opposi-
tion. This example also raises the possible contribution of alternative
economic arrangements beyond market solutions to complex societal
problems.
8. Negotiating market logics to cultivate energy consumers
As well as encouraging marketised community energy supply and
distribution, the CES introduced various demand-side measures.
Particular emphasis was placed on promoting the role of communities
for engaging domestic consumers with energy markets. The strategy
broadly assigned two roles for community: VCS organisations operating
as trusted intermediaries to provide information, advice and guidance
to help residents better engage with energy markets; and encouraging
local residents to collectively bargain with energy providers to increase
buying power (collective switching). These are encapsulated in two
national programmes: the Big Energy Saving Network (BESN) and
Cheaper Energy Together. This section introduces each of these before
exploring how they were mediated, translated and reappropriated ‘on
the ground’.
BESN is a ‘community outreach’ programme to help vulnerable
consumers reduce energy costs (DECC, 2014a). It aims to empower
households to “take decisions that will reduce their bills”, chieﬂy by
switching tariﬀ or energy supplier (DECC, 2013b; BEIS, 2017). BESN is
delivered by “trusted third sector and community bodies” (BEIS, 2017,
p. 6), understood to have existing, established relationships with target
populations. Community is invoked as delivery agents – neither state
nor commercial actors, often rooted in a particular place – and as
beneﬁciaries, the interest groups community organisations serve or
represent.
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Cheaper Energy Together was launched in 2012. Its premise, like
other collective switching initiatives, was that consolidating buying
power of large groups of consumers would allow more eﬀective nego-
tiation of discounted energy deals than individuals acting alone.
Increasing switching activity was expected to improve competition
among major suppliers and create opportunities for new and smaller
suppliers to enter the market or increase their customer base (Bates,
2012; DECC, 2013c). A typical collective switch involves consumers,
suppliers and two intermediary organisations: a specialist broker
managing technical aspects of the switch4 and a ‘community leader’
(usually a local authority) taking the customer-facing role, assuming
responsibility for promotion and recruiting participants (European
Commission, 2016b). Consumers express interest and provide their
household energy costs; suppliers are invited to participate in a ‘reverse
auction’, the winner being the lowest tariﬀ; consumers then decide
individually whether or not to accept the oﬀer. Like with BESN, the
‘community leader’ is seen as a trusted representative of a particular
population of people deﬁned by geographical location. This ‘commu-
nity’ is also cast as intrinsic to delivery: aggregate demand of thousands
of households is regarded as central to negotiating cheaper deals (Bates,
2012).
The eﬀect on energy market activity of these two programmes has
been limited. 11% of participants in the ﬁrst year of BESN switched
suppliers (DECC, 2015a), although most switches took place during
workshops, supported by advisors: only 3% switched independently
following participation. Cheaper Energy Together also met with vari-
able success. On average, the 22,000 households that switched each
saved £131 on annual energy bills (DECC, 2013c), but there is little
evidence collective switching involves greater consumer engagement
with energy markets. Only 11% of participants accepted the cheaper
tariﬀ they were oﬀered: as with an earlier campaign, many did not
change supplier despite having “already actively opted in” and that
“very little extra eﬀort was required to accept the oﬀer” (Deller et al,
2017, pp. 1–2).
This is partly explained by the well-established observation that
energy consumption is often invisible and its associated practices are
largely habitual and unreﬂexive (Shove, 2003; Hargreaves et al, 2010;
Gram-Hanssen, 2011). Any change is diﬃcult to achieve with in-
formation and incentives alone. However, evidence on collective
switching goes further: even when householders have already done
something active and non-routine, when the deal has been arranged
and the beneﬁts are brought to their attention, few actually switch.
There is resistance to becoming fully-ﬂedged ‘energy consumers’. Most
strikingly, Deller et al (2017) found that increased choice was negatively
associated with switching. Households oﬀered a choice of two or more
tariﬀs were signiﬁcantly less likely to switch than those receiving just
one oﬀer.
Impacts on competition were also muted. Experience varied across
the 31 Cheaper Energy Together-funded schemes: some increased the
customer base of smaller suppliers, yet the larger auctions were won by
larger suppliers (DECC, 2013c). Interviews with local stakeholders
suggest that smaller suppliers found it diﬃcult to provide a competitive
quote in these cases, lacking capacity to accommodate such a large
volume of potential customers. Regarding prices, energy providers
tended not to oﬀer discounted rates per se, instead promising cashback
to customers who switched and remained with the new company for a
minimum period, disincentivising further switching (DECC, 2013d;
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), 2016). Winning tariﬀs were
not necessarily market-leading; indeed for at least one scheme the same
provider already oﬀered a cheaper deal. Assessments of the potential to
shape energy markets were therefore modest: “You could conclude that
energy companies are still subverting the market really. We haven’t
really rocked the foundations.” (Local authority manager, interview).
Despite consolidation of consumer power anticipated through col-
lective switching schemes, other parties such as central government,
private sector intermediaries and large suppliers continued to dictate
terms. Tensions emerged, for example, in meeting commitments to
enrol ‘vulnerable’ populations, which was resource intensive in a period
of shrinking local authority budgets. This highlights local authorities’
challenges managing contradictory relationships with diﬀerent arms of
central government: in this instance with DECC as commissioners of the
programme, and the various departments allocating core local gov-
ernment funds.5 Further pressure came from energy suppliers to recruit
broadly, ostensibly to improve economies of scale, including more af-
ﬂuent customers:
“[The] council can aim to be primarily helping people in fuel pov-
erty and I think that's who it should be aimed at, but the suppliers
are coming back and saying you need to be aiming at all groups.”
(Local Government Association representative, interview)
Local authorities were encouraged to maximise appeal to large en-
ergy companies by compromising on ambitions to target fuel poor
households. These ﬁndings support a narrative of neoliberal co-option
of community action by government (Featherstone et al, 2012; Catney
et al, 2014), especially the enrolment of communities to promote
market rationality and the opportunities this aﬀorded large energy
businesses to defend their oligopoly.
However, an alternative perspective questions the unidirectionality
of this account. On the one hand, there is evidence of organisations
adapting their purposes and delivery models to ﬁt the agendas of
government funding programmes. In a context of scarce, insecure ﬁ-
nancial support, VCS organisations face pressure to attract “new busi-
ness” (BESN provider, interview). Similarly, for most local authorities
in our research, availability of grant funding through Cheaper Energy
Together was pivotal in deciding to introduce a collective switching
scheme. On the other hand, many felt this was a worthwhile compro-
mise to secure resources to pursue their own aims. For example, both
funding programmes provided a “foot in the door” (Local authority
manager, interview) to pursue a diverse collection of “wider and
longer-term goal[s]” (LGA representative, interview) from tackling
poverty to carbon reduction, lacking funds to address these concerns
directly. Other beneﬁts identiﬁed included: accessing training and peer
support; developing skills internally and in the wider community;
generating a base of ‘engaged’ households; building relationships with
VCS organisations; and establishing legitimacy with commissioners,
funders and private sector partners.
Particular governmental priorities, and the attendant resources,
were also utilised within organisations to negotiate internal politics: just
as national governments rarely speak with one voice, nor do local state/
non-state actors. The promise of BESN funding provided leverage to
bring prominence to previously marginal concerns:
“It helped push the ﬁnancial inclusion into the forefront a bit, cos
we were a bit in the background in the past … we were ﬁreﬁghting
rather than being proactive … [BESN] helped the ﬁnancial inclusion
team to force itself out there and say here's what we're all about.” (BESN
provider, interview)
“I was always saying we need to get projects on energy and ev-
eryone was a bit 'yeah why?', but now it's become a real topic.” (BESN
provider, interview)
Similarly, local authority oﬃcers used collective switching to en-
gage councillors in debates around energy eﬃciency and environmental
4 One commercial provider, iChoosr, is a leading facilitator and advocate of
collective switching schemes in the Netherlands, Belgium and more recently the
UK (European Commission, 2016b).
5 These departments include: Communities and Local Government; Transport;
Education; Health; and Work and Pensions. See https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/funding-allocations-to-local-authorities-paid-outside-
of-the-local-government-ﬁnance-settlement-2018-to-2019 for further detail.
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sustainability, by initially appealing to the urgent political priority of
“cheaper energy bills now!” (Local government manager, interview).
While it is a stretch to view these responses as resisting the market-
oriented logic of cultivating energy consumers, they do demonstrate its
creative appropriation for social and environmental ends.
This section has shown how use of community to produce ‘better’
energy consumers was partly hampered by their resistance to accepting
energy as a market commodity. It also highlights the reach of national
government to empower/disempower local and community actors, and
to shape their actions through the control of resources, most notably
through withdrawal and selective distribution of funding. At the same
time, community organisations were able to put market logics to use for
non-market endeavour, simultaneously acting with and against market
rationalities.
9. Discussion and conclusion
This paper exposed the ‘fractal’ nature of negotiations between
competing logics of energy market (re)production. It placed this in the
context of a broader governmental dilemma, bridging an ideological
commitment to self-regulation and recognition of the need to intervene
in energy markets to mitigate their negative eﬀects. Here the depoliti-
cised notion of ‘community’ becomes a popular focus of interventions to
eﬀect change at a distance. Focusing on the UK Community Energy
Strategy we explored ﬁrst how policy was produced and then enacted
through three further modes of energy market construction (shaping
markets, making new markets and cultivating consumers). Our dataset,
drawn from multiple points in the policy process, has allowed a novel
analysis which ‘zooms in’ on diﬀerent sites and modes of making and re-
making energy markets. Inevitably we have zoomed in on some sites
more than others. There notably remains a need for deeper investiga-
tion into the ‘inside’ of governing practices, their situated performances
and the relations among interdependent actors and interests that
characterise them (see Macrorie et al., 2015; Watson, 2017).
First, our analysis highlights the continual work required to create
functioning energy markets and diﬀerent ways that energy’s speciﬁc
materialities and social history make it resistant to marketisation. The
role of the state in constructing markets for energy has been more overt
than in other sectors, beginning with the well-publicised liberalisation
programmes of the 1980s onwards. Our research has revealed some of
the more low-proﬁle work involved in maintaining this vision, from
policy measures to introduce more market-like conditions (diversifying
competition, engaging consumers) down to managing the contra-
dictions these produce at their various sites of implementation.
Second, the work of making energy markets is political. Extending
Polanyi’s notion of the double movement, our analysis reveals similar
contestation between pro-market and pro-social logics recurring at
diﬀerent levels of focus: not just in the arena of formal politics or be-
tween state and commercial entities, but within sectors, within orga-
nisations, even down to the conﬂicted priorities of individual actors.
Compromises are reached, but are often temporary. Clearly, some ac-
tors have more reach than others to eﬀectively ‘manage possibility’.
Formal policy change, for example the introduction and later scaling-
back of feed-in tariﬀs, perhaps comes closest to ‘illuctionary’ (i.e. non-
contingent) eﬀects (cf. Butler, 2010). But for the most part our ﬁndings
illuminate how governmental interventions are translated and medi-
ated as they come to ground, not always landing in predictable ways.
Although policy is often treated as an object resulting from strategic
decision-making by elite actors, we have highlighted its emergent for-
mulation and outworking, subject to continuing contestation and ne-
gotiation.
Third, the use of communities in governing energy markets is par-
ticularly interesting in that it attempts to socially embed energy mar-
kets, while also marketising/disembedding community energy.
Community has been deployed to escape the dilemma of needing to
intervene without being seen to intervene. While avoiding the overt
political confrontation of (for example) directly regulating energy
companies, this form of indirect, diﬀuse intervention through commu-
nities instead created a dispersed and devolved set of micro-tensions at
diﬀerent points within the energy system, to be managed locally.
Conceptually, our ﬁndings highlight the limits to thinking in terms
of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of markets: a useful shorthand, but a
boundary frequently crossed in practice. For this reason, ‘entanglement’
arguably serves as a better metaphor than ‘embeddedness’ in thinking
about society-market relationships (cf. Callon, 1998). Energy market
actors (e.g. governments, investors, suppliers, domestic consumers) are
also state actors (e.g. in lobby groups, as voters) and community actors
(e.g. residing in a locality). They are constituted as actors by their
participation in these various capacities. More prosaically, even in their
capacity as energy market actors they often have interests in both camps,
embodying contradictory logics at the organisational or individual
level.
This point might be more apparent in a market for basic resources
such as energy than in more abstract ﬁnancial markets. It therefore
serves as a reminder that there is much to be gained from comparative
analyses of diﬀerent types of market in diﬀerent settings. Our analysis is
a product of a particular point in time; it is part of a wider story of
ongoing energy market (and community) construction. Between 2015
and 2018 community energy virtually disappeared as an explicit na-
tional policy agenda and the sector has been hampered by a number of
policy changes, as discussed above. However, there has been growth in
political rhetoric around greater intervention in energy markets. This
has included apparent willingness to regulate commercial providers
more stringently through, for example, introducing domestic energy
price caps. Thinking in terms of double movements, at any time and at
whichever level of magniﬁcation we focus, diﬀerent ‘sides’ will be in
the ascendency: this is a freeze-frame of a set of unresolved dynamic
processes rather than necessarily a point along a teleological trajectory.
The spatial focus is also distinctive. For instance, England is highly
centralised while devolution of resources to Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland make it increasingly diﬃcult to talk about the UK as a
single regulatory regime. Divergence on energy has occurred over the
time period covered in the paper, with Scotland increasingly taking a
lead on energy transitions, including through empowering local and
civil society organisations. Broadly speaking, the UK has pursued lib-
eralisation with particular fervour, but it remains formal policy within
the EU and other aﬄuent nations.
We emphasise the need to explore actually existing sites and mo-
ments of market construction and the negotiations this entails. For
example, while its regulatory arrangements and ideological commit-
ments are broadly similar, a study set in Germany would highlight
diﬀerent institutional relations, practices and discourses, including a
more decentralised state, with greater local resources and historic sub-
local government structures. Becker et al (2017), for instance, explore
tensions between diﬀerent local non-commercial interests. This con-
stitutes a diﬀerent setting for the negotiated construction of markets
which could be usefully explored through our framework. Our analysis
also ﬁts within a wider story of contested market construction. A focus
on energy is interesting because the hand of the state is overt, but the
same processes exist in more ‘mature’ market settings. Our approach is
immediately applicable to goods and services whose status as com-
modity is still a matter of considerable debate, such as housing or water.
But we could also imagine its application to domains such as food: more
readily conceived of as privately owned commodities, yet intimately
entangled with caregiving, meaning-making, enjoyment and survival.
Digital connectivity, increasingly essential to societal participation, yet
constructed from the outset as a marketised commodity, would be an-
other interesting case study.
More broadly, our analysis contributes to understandings of the
ontologically performative yet often path-dependent nature of political
processes. We set our study of ‘sites and moments’ within an interest in
the longue durée of political-economic change, seeking to zoom in on
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the recurring contestations that can be observed within the wider frame
and further bring critical political-economic analyses into dialogue with
constructivist and/or performative understandings of economies.
Speciﬁcally we draw attention to the fractal patterning of contested
social processes. However, despite this ‘self-similarity’ we emphasise
the provisionality and potential openness of processes whose inevit-
ability is too often taken-for-granted. This is useful conceptually, but by
highlighting possibilities for change and diﬀerence this approach also
seeks to counter discourses of fatalism in government and in everyday
life (Gamble, 2000) to produce more hopeful and empowering glimpses
of alternative futures.
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